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the prohibition era affect popular attitudes towards the law and law enforce-
ment? Simply unravelling the complicated system of overlapping federal and 
provincial responsibility would be a substantial contribution. Biographies of 
Donald Fraser, President of the New Brunswck Temperance Alliance, H.R. 
Grant, Secretary of the Nova Scotia Social Service Council, D.K. Grant, Chief 
Provincial Temperance Inspector and A.T. Logan, Chief Federal Preventive 
Officer, would shed considerable light on the frustration of dealing with rum 
running. 
Essentially, despite the wealth of entertaining accounts, very little is known 
about Atlantic Canada's rum running past. Information on Nova Scotia, St. 
Pierre, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick is steadily surfacing, but the 
Newfoundland experience and the French participation have hardly been 
scratched.7 Considering that participants in the traffic are rapidly aging it seems 
urgent that evidence should be collected quickly. But if rum running is going to 
be fully understood, it will be necessary to situate the industry more firmly 
within the broader analytical context of regional history. 
C. MARK DAVIS 
7 See P.E. Outerbridge, "When Newfoundland Went Dry", Atlantic Advocate (March, 1972), pp. 
46-9, and Arthur Doyle, Front Benches and Back Rooms (Toronto, 1976), p. 232-40. 
Canada in the American Century 
ONCE UPON A TIME, CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY seemed so simple. The Con-
servatives, rarely in power from the Great Depression on, were the party of the 
old empire, their view of the world coloured by Toryism, Loyalism, and British 
imperialism. The Liberals, Canada's governing party after 1935, were the party 
of the new empire, the United States, sharing with their American mentors a 
faith in anti-communism, internationalism NATO-style, and moralism of a 
secular Presbyterian sort. Then came the Trudeau years, years during which 
American power was temporarily weakened and a Liberal government, riding 
the crest of a resurgent Canadian nationalism, adopted a more independent 
policy vis-à-vis the United States. Now we have the Mulroney government, 
more neo-conservative than Tory in character, pledged to refurbishing the con-
tinental relationship at all cost and to playing the role of faithful supporter to 
Reagan's America on most foreign policy issues of the day. It is as though John 
A. Macdonald and Wilfrid Laurier had traded places, or more correctly, as 
though the old divide between Union Jack and Stars and Stripes had given way 
to a re-alignment between supporters and opponents of Uncle Sam. 
Several recent books on Canadian foreign policy may help us to understand 
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something of the shift that has occurred. They are predominantly concerned 
with the period before the 1960s and, in the case of two volumes, with the long 
decades stretching from Confederation to the end of the Second World War. 
One series of lectures originally given at the University of Toronto in 1980-81 
does bring the story reasonably up to date, though it already has a curiously 
dated ring. On the other hand, a recent monograph formally limited to the years 
following the Geneva Accords and the establishment of the International Con-
trol Commissions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, reads remarkably like a 
guide to the mind-set of the Reagan farm-team now ensconced in Ottawa. 
Let us begin by separating the chaff from the wheat. Considerable attention 
has been paid in the media to the diaries of Charles Ritchie, long-time Canadian 
diplomat and sometime adviser on foreign policy to Canadian governments. The 
most recent of these is Diplomatic Passport: More Undiplomatic Diaries, 
1946-1962 (Toronto, Macmillan, 1981). What are we to make of a man whose 
life seems a perpetual round of dinner parties and luncheons, whose major fear is 
to be judged "a Bore after one was dead — an immortal Bore" (p. 47), whose 
world is one from which "cruelty, violence and coarseness were altogether 
excluded (and) pain, and even discomfort, fended off wherever possible" (p. 51). 
With men like this in charge of our diplomatic missions from Paris to Bonn to 
New York, is it any wonder that the cry of the wretched of this earth seldom 
penetrated the muffled corridors of power? There are a few snippets of interest 
in Ritchie's book, Mackenzie King's gorging on lobster at the Crillon while 
keeping his expense account "recorded at a derisory figure" (p. 11), or the 
honest confession "I feel quite free to criticize the Americans, but when other 
people do it I instinctively rally to their defence" (p. 67), that should be inscribed 
on the portals of the Lester Pearson Building in Ottawa. Still, what a prig 
Ritchie proves himself to be, what a shallow and foolish companion to a post-
war world with all its artistic, intellectual and political currents. Nor is it any 
defence for him to argue on his own behalf that he has purposely omitted any 
political and diplomatic record from his diaries (p. 127). This only reinforces 
one's image of the diplomat as a lightweight, living for chit-chat and foie gras, 
evoking what Napoleon, in a cruel but penetrating commentary, once called 
Talleyrand, "a turd in a silk stocking". These diaries serve only to expose the 
biases of a scion of the old Canadian upper class. Beyond that, they have all the 
sophistication and permanent value of a series of Zena Cherry gossip columns 
placed between covers. 
Charles Stacey, by comparison, is a serious historian. Perhaps a trifle too 
serious for most readers, who will find the almost 800 pages of text in his two 
volumes on Canada and the Age of Conflict (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1981, 1984) hard slogging. For the first 50 years after Confederation, 
Stacey suggests, Canada was not really "a fact of international life" (I, p. 29), 
not even for the United States. At best, the Dominion was able to achieve some 
grudging recognition of its existence from south of the border on strictly con-
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tinental affairs, such as the International Joint Commission. More typically, 
Canadian interests were sacrificed on the altar of Anglo-American concord as in 
the Alaska Boundary Dispute of 1903, while Canadian foreign policy from the 
Boer War to the First World War was encompassed within the larger rubric of 
Imperial policy. For all the reluctance of Laurier to give Great Britain a blank 
cheque on naval policy, in practice Canada found herself at war at the same 
moment as Britain on 4 August 1914. 
It is here that Stacey's study comes alive and that his major theme is pre-
sented. For if there is a hero to his two volumes it is Robert Borden, at whose 
doorstep Stacey lays the credit for Canada's achieving international status in the 
aftermath of the First World War: "Borden was not a man of penetrating intel-
lect or an original political thinker; but in his dour Nova Scotia fashion he had a 
firm grasp of first principles. He was prepared to see Canada make great 
sacrifices for imperial causes in which the majority of the Canadian people be-
lieved, but he was determined that those sacrifices should purchase a share in 
imperial decision-making...The fighting men and the statesmen of 1914-19 were 
a new generation of Canadian founding fathers. If Borden's name is to be 
blazoned on the roll of Canada's great prime ministers, it is because of what he 
did to achieve a new position for her in the Empire and the world" (I, p. 287). 
For Stacey, Borden was the architect of Resolution IX of the Imperial War 
Conference of April 1917, which recognized the autonomous character of the 
Dominions and their right to an adequate voice in foreign policy and all impor-
tant matters of Imperial concern. He also played a key role during the peace 
negotiations that followed on the German surrender in ensuring that Canada and 
the other Dominions achieved full membership in the League of Nations in 
recognition of the significant military and economic contributions they had 
made towards the Allied victory. 
The second volume of Stacey's study is, by comparison, dominated by the 
personality of William Lyon Mackenzie King. King, unlike Borden, had little 
interest in Canadian participation within British Imperial Councils. On the con-
trary, the drift in Canada between the wars was towards greater isolationism, 
with the Chanak Crisis of 1922 heralding the disengagement of Canada from 
British concerns. The Halibut Treaty of 1925 and the opening of a Canadian 
mission in Washington suggested a re-orientation from the British to an Ameri-
can pole. The subsequent failure of the Imperial Economic Conference in 1932 
to stem the Great Depression suggested the futility of looking to the Empire for 
solutions. Stacey correctly pays much attention to Quebec as a key factor in ex-
plaining Canada's disengagement from British foreign policy throughout these 
years. He also, correctly in my opinion, suggests that when the chips were down 
in September 1939, it was the call of the blood for English Canadians that deter-
mined Canada's involvement alongside Britain in the Second World War. King 
skilfully avoided repeating Borden's mistake over conscription. He also cul-
tivated a close personal relationship with Roosevelt which was to help cement 
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the post-war Canadan-American continental relationship. The establishment of 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at Ogdensburg in August 1940, the Hyde 
Park Agreement on wartime economic cooperation, the February 1947 
announcement on post-war defence collaboration are all given careful attention. 
Stacey has no illusion about Canada's actual role in determining Allied policy 
during the Second World War, though King made sure he extracted whatever 
mileage he could from his personal contacts with the two charismatic figures, 
Roosevelt and Churchill. Interestingly enough, in light of the current revival of 
support for free trade between Canada and the United States, it is King who 
receives full credit for having scotched an earlier version in the fall of 1948, at 
the moment of his own retirement. Yet of King, Stacey has less good to say than 
of Borden: "It is interesting that no serious student of King's career, and virtu-
ally no Canadian of any sort, has ventured to call him a great man. Norman 
Robertson is recorded as saying, "I never saw a touch of greatness in him" (II, 
p. 425). This of the man who presided over our foreign affairs for a quarter of a 
century. 
There is much of value in Stacey's study, and there are a variety of other 
themes that I cannot touch on in the space of a review. Still, there are also some 
weaknesses in his approach and interpretation. One weakness is a tendency to 
see Canadian foreign policy from the top down, since his sources are almost 
entirely Archives, diaries and State Papers, with but passing attention to news-
papers and public opinion at large. Admittedly, the latter is a difficult thing to 
chart in the period before 1945, yet it seems to me that the pronouncements of 
the Orange Order or the organs of nationalist opinion in Quebec such as Le 
Devoir deserved greater attention. Neither Borden nor King were entirely free 
agents nor was Canadian foreign policy hatched in a vacuum. 
My major reservation regarding the Stacey volumes, however, stems from the 
question of interpretation. Stacey is a traditional historian, for whom ideology 
and ideological motivation take the relatively familiar by-ways of Conservative 
and Liberal, with scarce anything else to describe them. The word capitalism 
does not come easily to him, and one looks in vain for recognition of the role 
that economic forces, class interest or international economic position might 
play in shaping Canadian foreign policy. True, there are some figures in the 
Appendix to Volume II that show the realignment of Canadian trade and invest-
ment from Great Britain to the United States. But to what extent was Canada's 
involvement in the First World War, for example, a direct result of our de-
pendent position vis-à-vis Great Britain and of the lack of an authentic, in-
digenous capitalist economy? And to what degree was our intervention in Russia 
at the end of the First World War not just a passing aberration, as Stacey 
suggests (II, pp. 276-282), but deeply rooted in a Canadian counter-
revolutionary tradition that in a transformed version was to carry over into the 
Cold War period as well? Seen in this light, Borden is more a minor character 
than a hero. King, though a more mawkish person, is simply the instrument of 
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the changeover from the British to the American empire, all his protestations to 
the contrary notwithstanding. True, Canada achieved membership in the 
League of Nations in 1919 and in the United Nations after 1945. But did this 
country ever rise above junior partnership? There is nothing in the Stacey 
volumes to suggest that this was ever a real preoccupation of our policy-makers. 
Yet this issue, which is never addressed by Stacey, is the crucial one arising from 
the 80 years of history that he has canvassed in so much detail. 
With John Holmes, we enter directly into the postwar period, the so-called 
golden age of Canadian diplomacy, but simultaneously the period of the Ameri-
can alliance. Holmes, a long-time career diplomat and former Director of the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, is uniquely qualified to write what 
one might call an official history of those years and of a policy with which he 
was intimately associated. The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for 
World Order, 1943-1957, Vol. / /(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1982) 
is, on the whole, a quite readable study, which covers such major themes as the 
coming of the cold war, the creation of NATO, the Korean War, Canada's in-
volvement in Indo-China, our relationship to the Commonwealth and our role in 
the United Nations down to Suez. Holmes, who has been characterized by Doug 
Ross as a "liberal-moderate", is prepared to be reflective and analytical in his 
approach, which in the relatively sterile world of Canadian foreign policy-
makers, sets him off as something of an intellectual. 
On the Cold War, Holmes argues that there was not one uniform attitude, 
and that Canadian foreign policy makers were by and large less strident in their 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union than the majority view that came to prevail 
in the United States. The Canadians, in fact, tended to side with those in the 
American foreign policy community who sought opportunities for negotiation 
with the Soviets but were at the losing end. Holmes suggests that Canadian 
attitudes towards the Soviet Union were shaped by our own diplomats, men 
such as Dana Wilgress, and that our hostility to the Soviet system was influ-
enced less by a commitment to capitalist values than by one to liberalism and 
fair play. He recognizes some possible validity to the Marxist argument that 
would relate American and Canadian foreign policy in the post-1945 period to 
the dynamics of capitalism. But this does not make him any more friendly to 
revisionist writers who would hold the United States primarily responsible for 
the Cold War. Nor does it make him any the less committed to the road of align-
ment with the United States which Canada adopted, "the product of heredity 
and environment which actually emerged from that particular war in 1945" (p. 
88). Where critics of Canadian foreign policy would argue junior partnership, 
Holmes would claim, as he does in his short collection of lectures, Life wth 
Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1981), "The policy of a small power is no less independent because it 
decides to be an ally rather than an abstainer" (p. 39). 
Many pages of The Shaping of the Peace are spent trying to document 
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Canada's role as a middle power, in framing the North Atlantic alliance, in 
trying to modify American attitudes during the Korean War, in playing a useful 
bridge role between the U.K. and Europe and the United States, occasionally 
between east and west, and increasingly between the first and third worlds at the 
United Nations. How convincing an argument does he make? By and large, a 
weak one when it comes to direct Canadian influence on American policy or on 
NATO, or to our ability to take bold departures during the Cold War years. Our 
relationship to China helps illuminate this. While Canada was moving towards 
formal recognition of the People's Republic in the spring of 1950, the Korean 
War interrupted the process for two decades. At the United Nations, Canada 
subsequently voted the American line condemning China as an aggressor, 
despite behind-the-scenes dissent from the American position. As Holmes him-
self admits in The Shaping of Peace, "It is a very serious thing for a Canadian 
foreign minister to jeopardize his chances of a hearing in Washington, especially 
if he does so on a subject not specifically related to (a) kind of Canadian national 
interest" (p. 155). Nor was our position in NATO any different. "Inter-
nationalism was almost a religion in the decade after the Second World War...A 
new body of Canadian professionals...were feeling their oats, aspiring to a place 
nearer the seats of power. For them, NATO was a good club to belong to...(The 
members) included the inner directorate of the world balance of power, and the 
advantages of dining with them were considerably more than social" (pp. 
119-120). The parallel that comes to mind here is Borden's attempt to win 
Canada a place within the Imperial War Council. It is very much the foreign 
policy of a junior partner. The difference between Canada's position after the 
Second World War and that after the First World War, I would argue, was 
three-fold. In the first place, the enemy after 1945 was the Soviet Union, against 
which it was easier to forge common ideological bonds — between French and 
English Canada, between the policy-making establishment and big business — 
than against fascism during the inter-war period. Moreover, the spearhead of 
this alliance was the United States, with whom Canada's economic and cultural 
ties were overwhelming, and which our political elites, especially the Liberal 
Party, were prepared to support with little reservation. Also, there was little in 
the Canadian past, other than the abortive rebellions of 1837, that suggested a 
pattern of independence, and thus little reason for our foreign policy makers to 
discover such a motivation after 1945, once the switchover from Britain to the 
United States had occurred. 
Holmes is somewhat more convincing when he turns from east-west questions 
to the Commonwealth or the United Nations. Here, the absence of a history of 
Canadian imperialism made us more receptive to the New Commonwealth and 
indeed to the Third World than was true for the older colonial powers. At the 
same time, as Holmes shrewdly observes, our orientation to Asia came prin-
cipally through such Commonwealth states as India, Pakistan and Ceylon, 
rather than the Phillipines, Formosa or South Korea. Yet one should not go too 
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far here either. Canada's middle role during this period had a lot to do with the 
relative weakness of a yet-emerging Third World bloc at the UN, and with the 
particular conflict between British/French and American interests during the 
Suez Crisis. The UN and the Commonwealth of the 1960s and beyond would 
prove another story. 
Before leaving The Shaping of the Peace, let me highlight a few claims that 
cannot pass unchallenged. In describing official Ottawa's increasing hostility 
towards the Soviet Union after 1945, Holmes tells us "it was the brutal treat-
ment by the Russians of social democrats, workers in the resistance, and 
especially of Jews which alienated the policy-makers in Ottawa whose political 
philosophy was deeply liberal" (p. 23). In light of the well-documented evidence 
of official Ottawa's unconcern for the plight of Jews in Nazi Germany and 
occupied Europe during the Second World War, this statement seems hard to 
swallow. Regarding Canada's willingness to waive the rules and admit some 
36,000 refugees in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, among the 
reasons cited are a greater openness to immigrants in general and the greater 
sensitivity to human rights that exposure to the UN had given Canadians. But 
the crucial fact that these were white refugees from Communism is not given the 
pride of place which it deserves, one which can be contrasted with Canadian 
acceptance of refugees from right-wing regimes such as Chile or Guatemala. In 
another area too, some of Holmes' judgements appear altogether too jejune. For 
instance, Holmes scoffs at the exultation of U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Ray 
Atherton, in the fall of 1947, over the prospects of economic union between the 
two countries. Yet Stacey argues that this was no idle prospect, that key Can-
adian opinion-makers from CD. Howe to Douglas Abbott, Lester Pearson and 
Hume Wrong, John Deutsch and Graham Towers favoured a free trade scheme. 
In another instance, discussing the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and 
citing R.A. MacKay, Holmes tells us that Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, Canadian 
co-chairman in the late 1940s, "had tremendous influence over the American 
military thinking in Washington in general" (p. 276). One awaits the evidence 
from American sources to back this up. 
Life with Uncle gives us a more concise version of Holmes' reflections on the 
Canadian-American relationship. Some observations it is difficult to disagree 
with: "As a neighbour it is certainly better to be a Canadian than a Pole" (p. 2), 
or "The trouble with talking about the United States in confident generalities is 
that it is a kind of Jekyll and Hyde phenomenon, except that it is rarely as Jekyl-
lian as Americans like to think and very rarely as Hydean as its critics allege" (p. 
41). But Holmes is on particularly thin ice when he generalizes from the time of 
these lectures (1980-81) into the future. He writes: "Nationalism is now more 
widely based in both the Canadian and American communities — for better and 
for worse" (p. 3). Yet Canadian nationalism has weakened in the past few years, 
thanks to the international economic down-turn, free trade is being pushed 
actively by key business and government figures in Canada, and the new Prime 
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Minister has become a positive puppy-dog in his relations with the White House. 
The failure of Holmes' vision here is ideological and structural in character. 
Ideologically, he ignores his own acknowledgement of "trends and cycles" in 
political affairs (p. 113), assuming that the 1980-81 reality will persist indefin-
itely. Structurally, he underestimates the economic and political constraints 
under which Canadian foreign policy operated throughout the postwar period, 
including the decade which he celebrates so fullsomely in The Shaping of the 
Peace. Canadian foreign policy was never independent of the United States, no 
more than was the Canadian political economy independent of the American. 
The Trudeau years may have seen some modest moves towards economic 
nationalism and some new rhetoric in the talk of third options and north-south 
dialogue, but the substance of a nation's foreign policy is not so quickly altered. 
James Eayrs, in the latest volume of In Defence of Canada: Indochina: Roots 
of Complicity (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1983) goes some way 
towards elucidating the failures of the diplomacy which Holmes celebrates and 
which the Mulroney government, echoing that of St. Laurent, would have us 
relive. In approaching the tangled history of Indochina and Canada's involve-
ment in the International Control Commission set up pursuant to the Geneva 
Convention of 1954, Eayrs has set aside the ideological blinkers of Cold War 
liberalism. To be sure, the North Vietnamese were Communists, but they were 
also patriots, and it was this patriotism which was violated, first through the 
forcible return of the French after 1945, second through the splitting of Vietnam 
along the 17th parallel, and the attempt by the United States to promote an 
anti-communist regime dependent on them in the south. Communism, in other 
words, was not the abhorrent and unnatural phenomenon it would appear to be 
to Charles Ritchie with his upper class mannerisms, nor the strident doctrine 
associated with a Third World that Holmes latterly denounces. In this respect 
Eayrs follows the interpretations of the better American and Western historians 
of Indochina, and the views which Nehru and Menon advanced, identifying 
communism in Indochina with nationalism, and therefore associating the 
victory of the former with the later. 
Canada's role on the ICC, as a representative of the western powers, was a 
flawed one from the beginning, one which would place us increasingly side-by-
side with the Americans in what was ultimately a losing cause, the preservation 
of a divided Vietnam. To give Canadian policy-makers their due, they had never 
sought membership alongside India and Poland on the Commission, and it was 
the vicissitudes of the Geneva negotiations in 1954 that led them to accept "a 
thankless position" that was to extend over 20 years. Out of this thankless posi-
tion, the Canadians made themselves the effective accomplices of a power which 
had never signed the Geneva Accords — the United States. Eayrs shows how the 
initial Canadian concern, as articulated by Sherwood Lett, for a quasi-judicial 
role for the Commission, gave way under the pressure of events to a more 
partisan and political interpetation of the Canadian position. Other Canadian 
164 Acadiensis 
diplomatic personnel, such as Arnold Smith or Rudolphe Duder saw themselves 
as representatives of "the free world" in the finest Cold War sense of the term. 
They countered the partisanship of the Poles with a partisanship of their own. 
The violations of the cease-fire that offended the Canadians, such as freedom of 
movement of North Vietnamese wishing to move south, were quite different 
from the violations in the south, such as the refusal to hold all-Vietnamese elec-
tions as promised in the Geneva Accords. The Canadian attempt to win the 
Indian ear during the Commission investigations was the counter-part to the 
attempt to maintain the Americans' ear throughout the Canadian stay in Indo-
china. 
This is the crucial part of Eayrs' account. Almost from the beginning, Ex-
ternal Affairs was engaged in transmitting information which its commissioners 
acquired to the United States: "Information we have been passing to...Washing-
ton...under no circumstances should be...referred to in public. Should it become 
generally known that we are passing information to the United States Govern-
ment concerning the activities of the International Commission it would have 
very serious repercussions" (p. 219). These words from Lester Pearson set the 
tone for Chapter 8, "Helping our Friends". Whatever the original intention of 
Lett to remain faithful to the spirit of the Geneva Accords, after 1955 the Cana-
dian role became one of turning a blind eye to the activities of the U.S. proteges 
in the south and of energetically passing on information to the United States. 
Reports from the field, commission activities, conditions in Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia, intelligence on military preparations or activities in Viet Minh 
territory were all grist for this reporting process. Nor was Canada innocent of 
complicity with the larger purposes of American involvement in Vietnam. Blair 
Seaborn, Canada's Commissioner in the middle 1960s, was used as a go-
between from Washington to Hanoi in the period preceding the full-scale bomb-
ing of the north in 1965. Pearson, Prime Minister by now, seemed to go along 
with the "sticks" as well as "carrots" approach which Washington had adopted. 
And while men like Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, could 
wrap themselves in the mantle of impartiality that the ICC ostensibly repre-
sented, Canada had clearly become a collaborator of the United States. 
Much of Eayrs' account traces the frustration of the Canadian team in the 
field with their impossible mission, the various contacts that developed with the 
Indians and the Poles, with the Vietnamese, both North and South, and with 
headquarters back home. The descriptions are at points unnecessarily detailed, 
leading the reader to lose sight of the larger picture. But overall, Eayrs has 
written a convincing account of this chapter in Canadian foreign policy-making, 
and has shown a much greater sensitivity to the reality of Southeast Asia then 
most of our diplomats in the field were willing or able to do. 
What lessons can we draw from this complicity? That all other Canadian 
ventures, where American interests are deeply involved, would be of the same 
kind? That a Canadian role in a peace force in Central America, for example, 
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should one ever be created, might lead down the same twisted path followed by 
the Commissioners in Indochina? Such would seem to be a possible inference 
from this study. More crucially, it places in doubt the easy assumptions about 
independence and alliances that underlay the diplomacy of the "golden age", or 
the supposition that the Canadian view of the Cold War was so fundamentally 
different from the American. Has Canadian foreign policy with respect to the 
Cruise, or Central America, or the southern part of Africa been all that different 
from the American? Have Canadian foreign policy-makers learned the lessons 
about nationalism and communism, or begun to digest the fact that Marxism-
Leninism comes in different forms, and that regimes that bear this name are no 
more static and unchanging than any others? 
And that brings us, by way of conclusion, back to the essential theme of Can-
adian foreign policy in the American century. In moving from the British to the 
American sphere, we also moved ideologically from Toryism to liberalism. This 
liberalism, rooted as it was in a branch-plant capitalism, took succour from the 
Cold War and flourished with it. The 1960s, however, began to break down the 
comfortable synthesis between Cold War orthodoxy, Canadian liberalism and 
the American empire. American policy in Indochina ultimately proved a failure 
and led to a weakening of American influence for at least a decade. The coming 
of détente, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the evolving character of communism in 
China and elsewhere did much to alter the Manichean view of good and evil 
which long characterized the western and Canadian attitude towards com-
munism and revolutions of the left. Domestically, the greater nationalism of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, based particularly in the new middle class and the 
state sector, seemed to put paid to the old pattern of junior partnership, opening 
the door to a realignment of Canadian opinion on a left-right, rather than Amer-
ican-British axis. Broadly speaking, the left of the Liberal Party and the NDP 
were most forward in their opposition to a one-sidedly American pole in our 
national and international life. 
It was far from evident, however, that other sections of society were of the 
same mind. Various provinces registered their opposition to economic nation-
alism; big business and small were far from enthusiastic at the inroads which 
state enterprise was making into their domain; the welfare state was coming 
under attack in a period of shrinking pies. Re-grouping on the right was only a 
matter of time. Internationally, it has brought Thatcher to power in the U.K. 
and Reagan in the U.S., and with them a renewal of Cold War postures. The 
ideology of neo-conservatism goes hand in hand with a stress on military power, 
especially in the United States. Now Canada has elected a Conservative govern-
ment wth a massive parliamentary majority. What does this portend for our 
foreign policy? 
The answer that we could cull from a reading of Stacey and Holmes and 
Eayrs is that we may expect a greater congruence with the prevailing policies of 
the United States. The public statements of the Mulroney government to date 
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suggest a return to fashion of ideas such as free trade, the North American 
partnership, and the Western Alliance. It is only a matter of time until the 
phrase "free world" is rehabilitated. Yet Canadian foreign policy cannot throw 
off the pretence of internationalism which has been its mainstay since 1945. 
Hence, the rhetoric of disarmament to match a policy of greater military spend-
ing, a renewed emphasis on the United Nations while the important moves take 
place in NATO or the economic summits, an element of public charity towards 
the Third World, while our ties with the one power that really matters to the 
Conservatives are consolidated. 
We are still living in the American century. The Canadian right has given up 
its nostalgia for Great Britain and come to embrace an increasingly neo-con-
servative United States. Others cast about for ways to hold back a continental 
tide which could sweep away the moorings of an independent Canadian identity. 
Dependence vs. autonomy, complicity vs. independence — these are the poles 
within which Canadian foreign policy continues to operate. The pendulum, in 
the mid-1980s, has swung in a pro-American direction, after a decade and a half 
of the opposite. It is the left-right cleavage within Canadian public opinion that 
will determine for just how long it will remain there. 
PHILIP RESNICK 
